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Abstract 
 Using a mock witness methodology, we investigated the predictive value of 
metamemory measures and objective memory tests as indicators of eyewitness free recall 
performance. Participants (n = 208) first completed a metamemory assessment that included 
assessments of self-rated memory capacity, memory development and use of strategies. In a 
separate session, participants watched a mock crime video and provided a free recall account, 
followed by one out of four independent memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued 
recall, face recognition and general knowledge). Accuracy, amount of details reported, 
confidence and over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall were the main dependent 
variables. Results indicated three main findings: (1) subjective assessments of memory 
capacity were not related to eyewitness free recall performance; (2) although individual 
confidence and over/underconfidence was somewhat stable across different memory tests, 
accuracy was less stable; and (3) individuals with higher self-rated memory capacity had a 
slightly stronger confidence-accuracy relation in free recall. These results are discussed with 
respect to metamemory assessments and performance stability across memory tests of 
different domains. 








Metamemory and Eyewitness Free Recall       2 
Eyewitness statements are often critical in criminal investigations and may be the only 
available source of information about a crime when physical evidence is absent. Correct 
information provided by eyewitnesses can help investigators identify and trace suspects, but 
incorrect information can impede the investigative process, wasting valuable time and 
resources. Therefore, the ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information is 
critical when evaluating witness’s statements. Psychological research has identified some 
factors that can help discriminate eyewitness identification accuracy, such as confidence 
(Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted & 
Wells, 2017), decision time (Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004), and decision 
processes (Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; Weber et al., 2004). However, only a small number of 
studies have investigated factors that may assist with the estimation of accuracy in free 
reports (Dahl, Allwood, Scimone, & Rennemark, 2015; Odinot, Wolters, & van Giezen, 
2013; Sauer & Hope, 2016; Weber & Brewer, 2008). In the current research, we aimed to 
further investigate the relationship between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness free 
recall. We tested whether metamemory instruments and distinct memory tests can be used to 
estimate eyewitness accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence and 
over/underconfidence in a free recall task pertaining to the witnessed event. 
 
The eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship 
Confidence assessments may be present in many instances of criminal investigations, 
occurring whenever a police officer, lawyer or another law practitioner asks a witness if they 
are sure about a given account or identification. Lay people and practitioners in the criminal 
justice system often regard eyewitness confidence as a strong indicator of eyewitness 
credibility (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). Many studies have shown that 
confidence can be a valid indicator of eyewitness identification performance, especially when 
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confidence statements are collected soon after identification decisions (Brewer, Keast, & 
Rishworth, 2002; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, 
Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). However, eyewitnesses may 
exaggerate their confidence in an identification or their confidence may be inflated, 
particularly if encoding conditions are poor or if biased lineup procedures are used, making 
confidence statements in such circumstances less reliable estimates of accuracy (Douglass & 
Jones, 2013; Leippe, Eisenstadt, & Rauch, 2009; Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998; Penrod & 
Cutler, 1995). 
In eyewitness identification research, confidence-accuracy relationship is typically 
examined by adopting calibration procedures (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer, Brewer, 
Weber, & Nagesh, 2013). In this procedure, eyewitness accuracy is often plotted against 
specific confidence categories (e.g., proportion of accurate responses given with 10% 
confidence). Perfect calibration is represented by a linear function in which eyewitness 
accuracy is equivalent to each confidence category (e.g., 10% accuracy for 10% confidence 
responses, 20% accuracy for 20% confidence responses, and so on). Calibration analysis 
allow for different ways of assessing the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship, 
including three commonly adopted statistics: Calibration (C); Over/underconfidence (O/U) 
and Adjusted Normalized Resolution Index (ANRI). Calibration (C) represents how far a 
given calibration curve is from a perfect calibration. It ranges from 0 (perfect calibration) to 
1, and lower values indicate better calibration. Over/underconfidence (O/U) indicates if a 
curve strays more above or below the perfect calibration line, with values ranging from -1 
(very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident). The Adjusted Normalized Resolution Index 
(ANRI) represents how well confidence discriminates accurate from inaccurate responses, 
with higher values indicating better discrimination. C, O/U and ANRI are informative and 
complementary statistics. That is because C provides an estimate on how far a given 
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calibration curve strays from a perfect calibration, but it does not indicate whether weak 
confidence-accuracy relationships are due to overconfidence or underconfidence (which is 
provided by O/U). ANRI is a resolution statistic that provides an estimate on how well 
confidence can be used to distinguish accurate from inaccurate responses. 
Most research on eyewitness confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship has focused on 
suspect identifications, but witnesses’ freely recalled memories are also highly relevant in 
forensic contexts, since most of the information provided by eyewitnesses comprise 
descriptions of the perpetrator and the event (Van Koppen & Lochun, 1997). Some studies 
suggest that free recall paradigms generate stronger CA relations when compared to forced-
response or recognition memory paradigms (Robinson, Johnson, & Herndon, 1997; 
Robinson, Johnson, & Robertson, 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). Studies focusing on 
free recall of staged crimes, for example, have found CA correlations of around .60 (Odinot 
& Wolters, 2006; Odinot et al., 2013; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). In comparison, a meta-
analysis on the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship for identification tasks has found 
a weighted effect size of r = .37 for choosers and r = .12 for nonchoosers (Sporer et al., 
1995). The apparently stronger CA relation observed in free recall tasks may be accounted 
for by its “free” component, because in such procedures witnesses tend to choose which 
information to report based on their confidence, consequently increasing metamemory 
realism (Allwood, Jonsson, & Granhag, 2005). In fact, theoretical frameworks of memory 
reporting suggest that people balance the demands for informativeness and accuracy during 
cued-recall, withholding details that fall below a pre-set criterion of probable accuracy 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Robinson et al., 2000; Robinson & Johnson, 1996). However, 
important aspects of the CA relation in eyewitness free recall remain to be examined, 
particularly those related to individual differences in self-perceived memory capacity and 
memory functioning. 
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Metamemory and the CA relationship 
Metamemory refers to an individual’s knowledge and awareness of his or her own 
memory capabilities, based on previous experiences and beliefs (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). 
This introspective knowledge is used to monitor and control encoding, retrieval, reporting 
processes, and to provide information about memory confidence (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; 
Nelson & Narens, 1994). During confidence assessments individuals may rely mostly on 
memory trace strength, typically providing higher confidence ratings to stronger memory 
traces (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Notwithstanding, some authors argue that 
memory confidence may not only be related to memory strength, but also to intrinsic, 
heuristic and self-credibility cues (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). 
Intrinsic cues have been found to influence other types of metamemory judgements such as 
judgements of learning (Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004) and feeling of knowing (Koriat, 
2000). In legal settings, eyewitnesses might use the difficulty of the task as a cue to report 
confidence, showing less confidence for correct answers to hard questions when compared to 
correct answers to easy questions (Howie & Roebers, 2007; Stankov, 2000).  
Heuristic cues comprise one's beliefs about external factors that can help or impair 
memory encoding and retrieval, for example when eyewitnesses put more effort on recall 
tasks, even if it does not lead to changes in accuracy (Shaw & Zerr, 2003). These self-
credibility cues can also be derived from people’s beliefs about their overall memory 
performance. Some could overestimate their ability to recall events and show overconfidence, 
others may underestimate their memory ability and show underconfidence (Leippe, 
Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Stambush, 2006; Olsson & Juslin, 1999). Traits of self-confidence have 
also been linked to performance accuracy and other metacognitive factors (Kleitman & 
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Stankov, 2007), although memory self-credibility cues have yet to be explored in relation to 
eyewitness free recall memory. 
Memory self-credibility cues may have important implications not only on how 
individuals report confidence during free recall accounts, but also on the quantity and quality 
of information disclosed. Evans and Fisher (2011) argue that eyewitness free recall reporting 
is, in its essence, a metacognitive control process in which individuals strategically withhold 
uncertain responses, or choose to provide accurate responses that are likely to be imprecise 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). However, it is still unclear whether self-assessments of memory 
capacity play a role when witnesses are considering what information to disclose in terms of 
accuracy, quantity and precision. Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, and Shaked (2008) propose that 
memory monitoring processes may be partly based on the learning experience (i.e., the 
experience of processing and remembering the learning material) or on domain-specific 
beliefs (e.g., “I do not have a very good memory”). Unlike situational learning experiences, 
domain-specific beliefs are enduring and have been constructed on the basis of previous 
experiences and implicit theories and schemas about memory (e.g., perceived effects of 
ageing on memory, perceived memory stability across domains; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; 
Hertzog McGuire, & Lineweaver, 1998). If eyewitness confidence statements and memory 
traces are partially based on domain-specific beliefs, it might be expected that self-ratings of 
memory capacity are predictive of performance in eyewitness free recall tasks. 
 
Eyewitness recall and performance on objective memory tests  
Subjective self-ratings of memory capacity may be useful predictors of memory 
performance, but performance in objective memory tests might be more informative with 
respect to eyewitness accuracy, confidence and over/underconfidence. Some studies, for 
example, show that accuracy in different face memory tests are predictive of eyewitness 
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identification accuracy (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012; Morgan et al., 2007). 
However, to our knowledge, no research has examined the relation between eyewitness free 
recall performance and performance in unrelated memory tests, such as free-recall and cued-
recall for a non-criminal event, or face recognition and general knowledge tests. On one 
hand, some evidence shows that different memory systems are rather independent (Melby-
Lervåg & Hulme, 2013; Simons et al., 2016), suggesting that performance in one memory 
test may not be predictive of performance in other tests. On the other hand, a few studies 
indicate some stability in performance for different memory tests due to individual 
differences (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zhu et al., 2010). It may be expected that tasks 
more closely related to an eyewitness free recall paradigm (e.g., unrelated free recall or cued 
recall tests) are more predictive of eyewitness free recall performance than more distantly 
related tasks (e.g., face recognition and general knowledge). In the present experiment, we 
investigated the predictive utility of different objective memory tests (i.e., free recall, cued 
recall, general knowledge and face recognition) for eyewitness free recall performance, in 
order to examine stability in accuracy, confidence, and over/underconfidence across different 
memory domains. A recognition test for unrelated faces was included as a test more distantly 
related to the eyewitness free recall, in order to better examine the extent to which memory 
performance stability may change depending on similarities between memory domains. 
 
Current research 
The idea that confidence measures are affected not only by the availability of memory 
traces, but also by different intrinsic, heuristic and self-credibility cues is critical to the 
understanding and practical utility of confidence in forensic contexts. Previous research has 
shown that self-assessments of memory capacity can be used to estimate the diagnostic value 
of eyewitnesses’ confidence in identification tasks (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy, Bartlett, 
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& Memon, 2000). In this study, we tested the use of metamemory self-assessment 
instruments, and objective memory tests as predictors of eyewitness accuracy, completeness, 
confidence and over/underconfidence in a free recall task. We hypothesized that self-reported 
metamemory measures would be predictive of eyewitness accuracy (H1), amount of details 
reported (H2), confidence (H3); and over/underconfidence (H4). These predictions are based 
on theoretical frameworks suggesting that memory monitoring processes are influenced not 
only by the experiences of the quality of memory processes at the time the metacognitive 
judgment is made, but also by domain-specific beliefs (e.g., metamemory traits; Evans & 
Fisher, 2011; Koriat et al., 2008). Moreover, these predictions are based on some initial 
evidence that metamemory self-assessments are related to identification confidence, although 
mixed results can be found regarding the relation between metamemory and identification 
accuracy (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Searcy et al., 2000).  
Estimating eyewitness confidence using metamemory components relates to an 
important theoretical question, concerning the role of intrinsic cues on reports of confidence 
during free recall tasks. It was expected that individuals with higher metamemory scores 
(e.g., higher contentment with one’s own memory) would have a stronger confidence-
accuracy relation than individuals with lower metamemory scores (H5). Finally, it was 
hypothesized that performance in different objective memory tests would be predictive of 
eyewitness free recall performance (H6), and tests more closely related to the free recall test 
would be more predictive than tasks distantly related to this paradigm (H7). 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 208 participants was recruited from local and student community. Most 
participantes were recruited from the student community (77%) in relation to other local 
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participants (23%). Participants were aged between 18 and 70 years old, M age = 23.25, SD = 
9.33 and 81% were female. The required sample size was estimated using power analysis 
conducted for a Multivariate Regression Analysis with f = 0.05, alpha = .05 and power = 
0.95. The projected sample size needed for this effect size was approximately N = 205. 
Participants either received course credits or a £5 compensation for their time. 
All participants completed a metamemory assessment and a free recall test of a mock-
crime video. In a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to one of four possible 
objective memory test conditions: free recall, cued recall, general knowledge and face 
recognition. The dependent variables were accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence 
and over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall task.  
 
Materials 
Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002). The MMQ 
is an instrument with 57 items comprising three distinct factors: Contentment (i.e., affect 
related to memory abilities, α = 0.91), Ability (i.e., frequency of memory problems in 
different situations, α = 0.89), and Strategy (i.e., use of memory strategies in everyday life, α 
= 0.84). The factor Contentment consists of 18 items (e.g., ‘my memory is worse than most 
other people my age’) rated on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with 
higher scores indicating higher memory contentment. The factor Ability has 20 items which 
requires respondents to indicate how often they experienced memory mistakes over the last 
two weeks (e.g., ‘how often do you forget an appointment?’), on a scale ranging from 1 (all 
the time) to 5 (never). Higher scores in Ability indicate fewer (self-reported) memory 
problems in daily situations. The factor Strategy has 19 items related to the use of different 
memory strategies (e.g., ‘how often do you create a story to link together information you 
want to remember?’) and respondents indicate the frequency with which each strategy was 
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used over the last 2 weeks using a scale that ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time). Higher 
scores in Strategy indicate a more frequent use of memory strategies. 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Van Bergen, Brands, & Jelicic, 
2010; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979). The SSMQ is an instrument that assesses subjective 
memory functioning and consists of one single factor reflecting people’s beliefs about their 
own memory functioning (α = 0.93). The instrument includes 18 items (e.g., ‘My ability to 
reach back in my memory and recall what happened a few minutes ago is’), rated on nine-
point scales that range from -4 (worse than ever before) to 4 (better than ever before). Higher 
scores in SSMQ indicate a higher self-perceived memory functioning. 
Facial recognition and general memory skill assessment (Olsson & Juslin, 1999). 
Developed by Olsson and Juslin (1999), this instrument includes two items that assess self-
reported general memory skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your general memory ability, 
compared to other people’s general memory ability’) and two items that assess self-reported 
facial recognition skill (e.g., ‘give an estimate of your ability to remember faces as compared 
to other people’s ability to remember faces’). Participants indicate their ability in comparison 
to the normal population on a 11-point scale that ranges from -5 (much worse) to 5 (much 
better). 
Mock crime stimulus. The stimulus event for the eyewitness free recall task was a 
short film (2:30min) depicting a theft. In the film, two perpetrators (a man and a woman) 
follow a young man into his house. One of the perpetrators pretends to be lost and asks the 
victim for directions, and while the victim is distracted the other perpetrator steals his laptop, 
phone and keys. 
Objective memory tests 
Free-recall test. In the free-recall condition participants completed a second free-
recall test for a stimulus which was not associated with the eyewitness paradigm. In this 
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condition, participants watched a short film depicting a cleaning routine in a house (2.5min), 
then completed an unrelated filler task (5min) before completing a free-recall test concerning 
this cleaning stimulus film. 
Cued-recall test. In the cued-recall condition, participants watched the same film of 
the free-recall test condition depicting a cleaning routine in a house and then completed an 
unrelated filler task (5min). Next participants completed 17 cued-recall questions about the 
video (e.g., what did the woman do in the TV room?). Each question was followed by a 
confidence scale ranging from 0% (‘not at all certain’) to 100% (‘totally certain’). 
Face recognition test. Forty-five adult male faces with no unusual identifying features 
were selected from a database of faces (Thomaz & Giraldi, 2010). Faces were standardized in 
size, resolution, and background colour. During the training phase, 30 faces were displayed to 
participants in random order on a computer screen. Each face was presented for three 
seconds, with a three second inter-stimulus interval. After completing a 5min filler task 
participants took part in the testing phase, in which a second set of 30 faces was presented, 
including 15 faces from the training phase and 15 new faces. Each face was shown 
individually. Participants were instructed to indicate whether or not the face had been seen 
before and give a confidence judgement using a scale that goes from 0% (‘not at all certain’) 
to 100% (‘totally certain’). Participants had unlimited time to make their decision and 
proceed to the next face. 
General knowledge memory test. A pool of 38 general knowledge questions (e.g., 
‘What country is known as the Land of Rising Sun?’) was generated and pilot tested. Eight 
questions were considered too easy or too difficult and were removed from the final pool. 
Participants in the General Knowledge condition were asked to answer each one of the 30 
questions and rate their confidence in a scale that ranges from 0% (‘not at all certain’) to 
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First, using the online platform Qualtrics, participants completed the full set of 
metamemory measures (MMQ, SSMQ, and facial recognition and general memory skill 
assessment, Olsson & Juslin, 1999). Twenty-four hours after completing the metamemory 
measures, participants took part in a lab session. Not all participants who completed the 
online session (N = 287) signed up to the lab session (N = 208), so participant recruitment 
continued until we achieved our stipulated sample size (minimum of N = 205). In the lab 
session, participants first watched the mock crime stimulus film and then completed an 
unrelated filler task (5min). Immediately after participants received the free recall test about 
the mock crime. The instructions were as follows: “In the space provided, report all details 
that you can remember about the video, including the sequence of actions and events, and the 
people that were involved. If you recall information or specific details out of the order in 
which they happened, report these details as they come to mind (i.e., do not leave out any 
details.) Do not guess about details that you cannot remember. Feel free to use full sentences 
or bullet points – but please make sure your report is as complete and accurate as possible”. 
When participants finished the task, the researcher read through the report and marked each 
detail for which participants should now report a confidence judgement (e.g., A caucasian (1) 
man (1) in a burgundy (1) hoody (1) stole (1) the bike (1) = 6 details). Participants were then 
asked to read through the statement and indicate their degree of confidence for each detail, 
using a scale that ranged from 0% (‘not at all certain’) and then 10, 20, 30, … to 100% 
(‘totally certain’). After completing their confidence assessment, participants took part in the 
objective memory test corresponding to their randomly allocated experimental condition (i.e., 
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free recall, cued recall, general knowledge and face recognition). Ten per cent of all 
eyewitness recall transcripts were coded independently by two raters and Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficients were calculated for number of details = .97 (95% CI = .93, .99), and 
correctness = .96 (95% CI = .92, .98) 
 
Results 
Our analysis focused on four dependent measures in the eyewitness free recall task: 
accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence and over/underconfidence. Accuracy was 
defined as the proportion of accurate responses reported, amount of details as the total 
amount of accurate details, and confidence as the mean of all confidence statements provided 
for each detail. In calibration research, over/underconfidence can be computed as a statistic 
that relates to how well calibrated participants are in their confidence-accuracy relationship, 
ranging from −1 (very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident; see Brewer & Wells, 2006 
for calculation details). Similar scores were computed for all objective memory tests (i.e., 
free recall, cued recall, general knowledge and face recognition). Scores on the objective 
memory tests served as predictors of eyewitness free recall performance, instead of being 
treated as dependent variables (see Table 1). 
[Table 1 near here] 
Metamemory scale scores and eyewitness free recall performance 
 First, we fitted a multivariate regression model including the scale scores on the 
metamemory assessments as predictors of free recall accuracy, amount of details reported, 
confidence and over/underconfidence. One outlier in the amount of details variable was 
highly influential in the test parameters (Cook's Distance = 0.13) and was capped to the upper 
limit to avoid biased results. QQ-plots revealed that the errors distribution in the accuracy and 
confidence models were not normally distributed. Therefore, we fitted these models using 
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gamma distributions in order to obtain more robust estimates (Manning, Basu, & Mullahy, 
2005). None of the metamemory scales were predictive of accuracy, amount of details 
reported, confidence or over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall test (smallest p 
value = .17). Results from four different multivariate tests (Pillai, Wilks, Hotelling-Lawley, 
and Roy) suggest that the coefficients for MMQ-Contentment, MMQ-Strategy, MMQ-
Ability, SSMQ, and the facial recognition and general memory skill assessment by Olsson 
and Juslin (1999) do not seem to be statistically different from 0 for any of the dependant 
measures (see Table S1 in the supplemental materials). Bayesian multiple regression models 
were fitted to further examine evidence for the null model, using a standard Jeffreys–Zellner–
Siow prior (see Table 2). Results revealed that marginal inclusion probabilities for all 
coefficients in the accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence and over/underconfidence 
models were negligible (highest inclusion probability = .07; Kruschke, 2015). Therefore, 
subjective assessments of memory capacity were not related to eyewitness free recall 
performance. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Objective memory tests and eyewitness free recall performance 
 We used simple regressions to test the relationship between eyewitness free recall 
performance and performance on the four different memory tests (see Table 3). Eyewitness 
free recall accuracy was predicted by cued recall accuracy (β = 0.38), but not by accuracy in 
the other memory tests. Confidence in the eyewitness free recall was predicted by confidence 
expressed in the free recall (β = 0.75), cued recall (β = 0.54) and general knowledge memory 
tests (β = 0.30). A similar pattern of results was observed for over/underconfidence in the free 
recall test, which was predicted by over/underconfidence in the free recall (β = 0.63), cued 
recall (β = 0.56) and general knowledge (β = 0.49) tests. Performance in the face recognition 
test did not relate to any of the performance variables in the eyewitness free recall. Therefore, 
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although individual confidence and over/underconfidence was somewhat stable across 
different memory tests, accuracy was less stable. 
[Table 3 near here] 
Metamemory and confidence-accuracy calibration analysis 
 Calibration analyses were conducted to test the relation between the metamemory 
scale scores and eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship in the eyewitness recall test. 
The legalPsych package in R was used for all calibration calculations (Van Boeijen & 
Saraiva, 2018). We first produced calibration curves for the eyewitness free recall test (see 
Figure 1) and the other memory tests (see Figure 2). The diagonal line represents perfect 
calibration, such that each level of confidence is equivalent to the level of accuracy for 
decisions made with that level of confidence. Observations above this line indicate 
underconfidence, and observations below this line indicate overconfidence. Three calibration 
statistics were computed: calibration index, over/underconfidence and resolution. Calibration 
(C) represents how far a given calibration curve is from a perfect calibration. It ranges from 0 
(perfect calibration) to 1, and lower values indicate better calibration. Over/underconfidence 
(O/U) indicates if a curve strays more above or below the perfect calibration line, with values 
ranging from -1 (very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident). The Adjusted Normalized 
Resolution Index (ANRI) represents how well confidence discriminates accurate from 
inaccurate responses, with higher values indicating better discrimination (see Brewer and 
Wells (2006). Following Palmer, Brewer, Weber and Nagesh (2013), we used a jackknife 
procedure to compute standard errors for each calibration statistic, which were then converted 
to 95% inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2008). If the confidence intervals do not 
overlap, that indicates a significant difference (see Table 4). The C statistic pointed to a 
reasonably strong calibration for the eyewitness free recall test (C = .02). However, 
examining the calibration curves it can be observed that most information disclosed was 
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accurate, even those reported with low levels of confidence, so that confidence and accuracy 
in the eyewitness free recall did not co-vary systematically (see Figure 1). Therefore, the 
calibration statistics (C, O/U and ANRI) should be interpreted taking into account the low 
variability in accuracy for the eyewitness free recall test. For example, the C statistic points to 
a strong calibration for the eyewitness free recall test (C = .02) mainly due to a high number 
of correct responses given with high confidence levels (e.g., 90%-100% confident). 
Performance in the face recognition was the most distant from perfect calibration, presenting 
underconfidence for lower levels of confidence and overconfidence for higher levels of 
confidence.  
[Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 4 near here] 
Next, we compared calibration statistics between high and low scorers on each of the 
metamemory measures. Following a procedure similar to the one used by Olsson and Juslin 
(1999), individuals above the 66th percentile were selected as high scorers and individuals 
below the 33th percentile were selected as low scorers (see Figure 3). Inspection of the 
confidence intervals suggest that high scorers in the MMQ-Contentment, MMQ-Ability, 
SSMQ, and General Memory Skill were less underconfident and slightly better calibrated 
than low scorers in those components. There were no observable differences between the 
resolution scores of high and low metamemory scorers. Therefore, individuals with higher 
self-rated scores in some metamemory factors had a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy 
relation in the eyewitness free recall. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
Discussion 
 Recently there has been great interest in the predictive utility of subjective and 
objective memory assessments for eyewitness performance (e.g., Baldassari, Kantner, & 
Lindsay, 2019; Russ, Sauerland, Lee, & Bindemann, 2018). In the current study testing the 
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use of metamemory measures and memory tests as predictors of eyewitness free recall 
performance, we contribute three key findings: (1) Contrary to some of our hypotheses, the 
metamemory scales examined had no relation with accuracy, amount of details reported, 
confidence or over/underconfidence in eyewitness free recall; (2) Individuals with high 
metamemory scores presented a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy calibration in 
eyewitness free recall; and, (3) Eyewitness free recall confidence and over/underconfidence 
was predicted by performance in objective memory tests. These findings extend our 
understanding of how eyewitness performance relates to subjective self-assessments of 
memory ability (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Evans & Fisher, 2011) and objective memory 
performance in different tasks (Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2007).  
We predicted that self-assessments of memory capacity and other metamemory 
components would be related to eyewitness accuracy, amount of details reported, confidence 
and over/underconfidence. Previous studies have found positive associations between 
eyewitness free recall performance and individual differences such as working memory 
capacity, intelligence, and temperament (Chae & Ceci, 2005; Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; 
Zhu et al., 2010). In the current study, we adopted diverse measures assessing different 
components of metamemory, such as memory ability, endorsement of memory strategies, and 
memory development over time. Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the metamemory 
scales used related to eyewitness free recall performance, suggesting that intrinsic cues of 
general memory capacity may have no relation with the amount of details reported or quality 
of eyewitness memory reports. The metamemory scales are also unrelated to the confidence 
or over/underconfidence in the eyewitness free recall, suggesting that confidence expressed 
for freely recalled information may originate mostly from memory trace strength, rather than 
self-credibility cues.  
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Some theoretical frameworks propose that individuals freely recalling a witnessed 
event monitor their memories and control what they report in order to achieve an acceptable 
accuracy (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, and 
Shaked (2008) argue that monitoring process may be based on domain-specific beliefs (e.g., 
“I do not have a very good memory”) or on the learning experience (i.e., the experience of 
processing and remembering the learning material). Our findings demonstrate that learning 
experience may be more influential than domain-specific beliefs when eyewitnesses are 
monitoring which and how much information to disclose during free recall. If replicated, 
these findings can be an indication that individual differences in metamemory are of little 
value in estimating eyewitnesses’ disclosure of information. However, given that witnesses in 
the current study demonstrated high levels of accuracy which can also explain why learning 
experience was more influential than domain-specific beliefs, these relationships need to be 
further examined by testing witnessing conditions with higher variability in encoding 
difficulty. Furthermore, our metamemory assessment focused on broader memory self-
efficacy domains (e.g., “I am unhappy with my general memory ability”), so future studies 
may benefit from examining metamemory assessments that are more specifically related to 
eyewitness domains (e.g., Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 2019; Saraiva et al., 2019) 
Apart from the finding that metamemory measures are not predictive of free recall 
over/underconfidence on the individual level, we observed that individuals who score high on 
some metamemory components have a stronger confidence-accuracy relationship than low 
scorers in the group level. Specifically, individuals who claim to have higher memory 
contentment, self-rated memory ability, and memory development over time are slightly less 
underconfident than those individuals with lower scores in the same components. So, at least 
at the group level, individuals with higher levels of contentment with their own general 
memory ability may present confidence statements that better reflect their probable accuracy 
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in an eyewitness free recall task. In other words, individuals who are not content with their 
own memories may present lower confidence statements even if they are probably accurate. 
That finding is consistent with previous results by Olsson and Juslin (1999), who observed 
that individuals who rated themselves as good face recognizers demonstrated a more 
diagnostic confidence-accuracy relation. It is important to note, however, that this effect was 
mostly associated to lower level of confidence, given that responses with high levels of 
confidence were almost invariantly correct. That is, high levels of confidence in the free 
recall tasks were almost always associated with correct information. It should also noted that 
participants demonstrated high levels of accuracy in the eyewitness free recall task, so the 
observed confidence-accuracy relation may differ in situations where witnesses do not 
present high free recall accuracy. Furthermore, the associations between those metamemory 
measures (i.e., memory contentment, self-rated memory ability, and memory development) 
and eyewitness over/underconfidence were only observed on the group level (i.e., low raters 
vs high raters), and no direct relation was observed when testing the same measures as 
predictors of over/underconfidence. 
In contrast to subjective self-ratings of memory ability, stable individual differences 
in objective memory performance may be a better indicator of eyewitness free recall 
performance. In fact, in some studies it was found that performance in face recognition tests 
is somewhat predictive of eyewitness lineup performance (e.g., Baldassari et al., 2019; Russ 
et al., 2018). In the current study, we predicted that performance in different memory tests 
would be related to performance in an eyewitness free recall task. The results show that 
amount of details reported in an eyewitness free recall was closely related to the amount of 
details reported in an unrelated free recall. This finding seems to indicate some stability in the 
reporting of accurate information across different testing situations, which may be explained 
by individual differences related to attentional and cognitive resources, engagement with the 
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task, or a combination of both (Aslan & Bäuml, 2011; Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & Hulme, 
2016).  
We also observed that confidence and over/underconfidence in the free recall, cued 
recall and general knowledge tests were predictors of confidence and over/underconfidence 
in the eyewitness free recall test. This finding corroborates previous findings showing that 
individuals express confidence in a somewhat stable manner across different testing 
conditions, including eyewitness memory domain (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Jonsson & 
Allwood, 2003; Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Mengelkamp & Bannert, 2010). Jonsson 
and Allwood (2003), for example, found some individual stability in confidence judgements 
for word knowledge and logical/spatial ability tasks, while Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999) 
found that overconfidence, calibration, and resolution in a general knowledge and cued recall 
test were positively correlated. We expand on those findings by presenting evidence of 
individual stability not only for confidence, but also for over/underconfidence in eyewitness 
free recall and unrelated tests (i.e., free recall, cued recall and general knowledge). 
Interestingly, this association was stronger for memory tests more closely related to the 
eyewitness free recall task (e.g., free recall, followed by cued recall and general knowledge). 
Complementarily, there was no stability between the eyewitness free recall and face 
recognition task, a finding in line with models outlining independent systems for face, 
episodic and semantic memory (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004). Such consistency in individual’s 
confidence and overconfidence for similar memory domains may be explained by stable 
metacognitive cues (e.g., previous experience in that memory domain; Koriat et al., 2008). 
Taken together, our results support frameworks that propose domain-specific memory self-
efficacy, defined as an individual’s appraisal of his or her usual ability in a given memory 
domain (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Furthermore, these findings 
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align with previous studies suggesting that self-confidence traits are meaningfully related to 
cognitive abilities (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007). 
 Eyewitness statements are commonly sought to aid investigations or to obtain 
incriminatory or exculpatory evidence. We found no indication for a relation between 
eyewitness free recall performance and metamemory self-assessments, including self-rated 
memory ability, endorsement of memory strategies and memory development over time. This 
finding may contribute to two theoretical predictions requiring further research: (1) 
individuals may have limited insight on their own general memory ability (Beaudoin & 
Desrichard, 2011; Perfect, 2004); or (2) individuals may have accurate insight on their 
general memory ability, but such intrinsic cues have little influence on the disclosure of 
witnessed events (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). From a practical 
perspective, it is problematic to question the credibility of eyewitness reports based on 
general self-assessments of memory capacity. As argued by Evans and Fisher (2011), 
contrary to common belief eyewitnesses who say ‘I don’t know’ more often may be more 
accurate than other witnesses, given that they are better monitoring their reporting to provide 
accurate information. Additionally, we observed that on the group level individuals who 
distrust their own memories have a weaker confidence-accuracy relationship, presenting 
lower confidence statements even if they are likely accurate. If replicated, this finding could 
offer a basis for metamemory assessments to better discriminate overconfident and 
underconfident eyewitnesses. Finally, we found some stability between eyewitness free recall 
performance and performance in related memory tasks (i.e., unrelated free recall, cued recall 
and general knowledge). This result lends some support to the concept of an objective test 
designed to estimate eyewitness free recall performance, an approach that has been tested for 
eyewitness identification settings (Baldassari et al., 2019; Bindemann et al., 2012; Morgan et 
al., 2007). 
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There are a number of limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, the 
mock crime video was seen in the same session as the eyewitness free recall test. This 
procedure was adopted to guarantee the feasibility of the study, but in more naturalistic 
contexts eyewitnesses commonly report what they have seen after a longer delay. In fact, it is 
unlikely that eyewitnesses would provide their accounts immediately after the critical event, 
given that officers who are deployed to the crime event may be faced with responsibilities 
that take precedence over interviewing witnesses (e.g., securing and preserving the crime 
scene). Importantly, previous studies have found differential effects of self-capacity measures 
and stability in memory tests that were dependant on task difficulty (Howie & Roebers, 2007; 
Mengelkamp & Bannert, 2010; Stankov, 2000). It may be the case, for example, that the 
relation between objective memory tests and eyewitness free recall performance is weaker if 
there is significant memory decay for information about the crime. Furthermore, we observed 
high accuracy and high confidence in the eyewitness free recall reports, which may have been 
due to the nature of the task or because the interval between encoding and retrieval was short 
making the task easy. The high accuracy observed for the eyewitness free recall test also 
limits the interpretation of calibration findings, given that the reported calibration statistics 
(C, O/U, ANRI) represent average point estimates. Therefore, the procedures adopted to 
guarantee the feasibility of the study should be taken into account when generalizing the 
observed results to real crime situations. We highlight the need for research that investigates 
associations between measures of self-efficacy, performance in objective memory tests, and 
eyewitness free recall performance under varying levels of difficulty (e.g., longer retention 
intervals; Sauer et al., 2010). A second limitation is that the metamemory assessment always 
occurred 24 hours before the eyewitness paradigm. In naturalistic contexts, such 
metamemory assessment would realistically occur after an eyewitness account was obtained. 
In determining our procedure, we reasoned that exposure to the eyewitness paradigm and 
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other memory tests before the completion of the metamemory measures would have affected 
witnesses’ self-assessments of their memory abilities to a greater degree than completing the 
assessments would affect eyewitness performance. While this was perhaps appropriate for an 
initial test of relationships between the tasks, future studies should examine the use of 
metamemory measures after the eyewitness task. 
 
Conclusions 
In sum, our results allow for three main inferences. First, metamemory assessments 
appear to have little value in estimating individual performance in eyewitness free recall 
settings. With reference to utility in the applied context, this finding suggests that dismissing 
or questioning the credibility of eyewitness reports based on self-assessments of memory 
capacity may be unwarranted. Second, at the group level individuals with higher self-ratings 
of memory capacity had a slightly stronger confidence-accuracy calibration. This is initial 
evidence that free recall confidence is a better predictor of accuracy among individuals that 
are not very doubtful about their own memory performance. Third, we find stability in 
confidence and over/underconfidence measures across eyewitness free recall and other 
memory tests of similar domain. If this relationship is replicated in future research it may 
indicate that individual differences or intrinsic metamemory cues (e.g., experience with 
memory issues) partly explain levels of realism for confidence judgements in memory tasks. 
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Table 1 
 













(n = 208) 
0.97 (0.04) 40.7 (11.4) 0.92 (0.58) -0.04 (0.06) 
Free recall 
(n = 55) 
0.95 (0.05) 30.2 (13.2) 0.93 (0.52) -0.02 (0.06) 
Cued recall  
(n = 50) 
0.69 (0.11) - 0.64 (0.14) -0.05 (0.13) 
Face recognition  
(n = 50) 
0.45 (0.08) - 0.43 (0.92) -0.01 (0.15) 
General Knowledge  
(n = 55) 
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Table 2 
 
Bayesian Multiple linear regression models including metamemory scales as predictors of 
eyewitness free recall performance 
    95% Credible Interval 
Coefficient M SD BFinclusion Lower Upper 
Free recall accuracy      
MMQ-Contentment -1.033e -4  9.148e -4  0.049 0.000  0.000 
MMQ-Ability 7.298e -5  9.946e -4  0.045  0.000  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies -1.113e -4  9.914e -4  0.049  0.000  0.000  
SSMQ -5.650e -7  4.521e -4  0.042  0.000  0.000  
General Memory Ability 4.057e -6  3.028e -4  0.042  0.000  0.000  
Face Memory Ability -1.961e -5  2.760e -4  0.044  0.000  0.000  
Free recall accuracy      
MMQ-Contentment -0.018  0.273  0.047  0.000  0.000  
MMQ-Ability -0.043  0.383  0.052  -0.110  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies 0.071  0.423  0.065  0.000  0.611  
SSMQ 0.016  0.177  0.049  0.000  0.000  
General Memory Abilit 
y 
-0.002  0.105  0.045  0.000  0.000  
Face Memory Ability 0.012  0.105  0.052  -0.085  0.000  
Free recall confidence      
MMQ-Contentment -0.003  0.033  0.186  -0.100  0.068  
MMQ-Ability 0.055  0.088  0.596  0.000  0.261  
MMQ-Strategies -0.007  0.035  0.193  -0.135  0.021  
SSMQ 0.012  0.032  0.302  -0.011  0.090  
General Memory Ability 0.012  0.026  0.418  -0.007  0.090  
Face Memory Ability 0.018  0.027  0.678  -0.002  0.077  
Free recall over/underconfidence      
MMQ-Contentment 2.426e -4  0.002  0.064  -8.178e -4  3.309e -4  
MMQ-Ability -0.002  0.005  0.132  -0.017  0.000  
MMQ-Strategies 1.985e -4  0.002  0.061  -8.374e -5  0.002  
SSMQ 1.333e -4  0.001  0.059  -3.329e -4  5.241e -4  
General Memory Ability 5.799e -5  8.374e -4  0.057  -1.340e -4  5.694e -4  
Face Memory Ability -4.606e -5  6.504e -4  0.056  -2.721e -4  2.763e -4 
  







Regression models using performance in the different memory tests as predictors of eyewitness free recall 
performance 
 B (SE) B CI β t p 
Eyewitness recall amount of 
details 
     
Free recall amount of details 0.57 (0.07) [0.41, 0.72] 0.71 7.44 <.001 
Eyewitness recall accuracy      
Free recall accuracy 0.12 (0.10) [-0.08, 0.34] 0.16 1.23 .22 
Cued recall accuracy 0.14 (0.05) [0.04, 0.25] 0.38 2.92 <.01 
General Knowledge accuracy -0.04 (0.02) [-0.07, 0.01] -0.21 -1.59 .12 
Face recognition accuracy -0.04 (0.04) [-.12, 0.05] -0.12 -0.84 .40 
Eyewitness recall confidence      
Free recall confidence 0.83 (0.09) [0.63,1.03] 0.75 8.34 <.001 
Cued recall confidence 0.25 (0.05) [0.13, 0.36] 0.54 4.49 <.001 
General knowledge confidence 0.09 (0.04) [0.01, 0.17] 0.30 2.27 .02 
Face recognition confidence -0.05 (0.08) [-0.23, 0.12] -0.08 -0.60 .54 
Eyewitness recall OU      
Free recall OU 0.70 (0.11) [0.46, 0.94] 0.63 5.84 <.001 
Cued recall OU 0.29 (0.06) [0.17, 0.42] 0.56 4.71 <.001 
General knowledge OU 0.24 (0.06) [0.12, 0.36] 0.49 4.03 <.001 
Face recognition OU 0.08 (0.06) [-0.04, 0.21] 0.17 1.26 .21 







Calibration statistics for each memory test with inferential confidence intervals (ICI) 
 C [ICI] OU [ICI] ANRI [ICI] 
Eyewitness recall 0.02 [0.01,0.02] -0.05 [-0.05, -0.04] 0.04 [0.02, 0.06] 
Free recall 0.01 [0.01,0.01] -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01] 0.09 [0.02, 0.15] 
Cued recall 0.02 [0.01, 0.03] -0.05 [-0.08, -0.02] 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] 
General Knowledge 0.01 [0.01, 0.02] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] 0.35 [0.30, 0.40] 
Face recognition 0.07 [0.06, 0.09] -0.03 [-0.06, 0.00] 0.01[-0.01,0.01] 
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Figure 1. Calibration curves of eyewitness free recall. Error bars are 95% confidence 












Metamemory and Eyewitness Free Recall       38 
Figure 2. Calibration curves of the objective memory tests. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. n 
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Figure 3. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in 
each metamemory measure. 
 
 
